










Fiscal troubles abroad are intensifying scrutiny of government reporting and
management of public finances. Canadian governments also need to improve
their accountability and rein in chronic spending over-runs. 
NO. 142, SEPTEMBER 2011
FISCAL & TAX COMPETITIVENESSFiscal pressures and sovereign debt concerns around the world are intensifying scrutiny of
government finances. Even in Canada, where these pressures and concerns are less acute,
federal and provincial fiscal controls could be better.
Some Canadian governments still present budgets to their legislatures using different
accounting than appears in their public accounts at year-end. Some present their public
accounts far too late. Auditors do not always give unqualified approval. Most, however,
have improved their financial reporting – with Ottawa, Ontario and New Brunswick
standing out – showing that progress is possible, and setting the mark for others to follow.
When it comes to the differences between budgets and results, spending overruns and
missed revenue targets have been commonplace over the past decade. Spending overruns
are so frequent and large that the cumulative total among the federal, provincial and
territorial governments over the decade exceeded $82 billion – meaning that Canada
entered the slump with debts and taxes higher than would have occurred if governments
had fulfilled their budget promises. Deviations between budgeted and actual amounts tend
to be worse in the jurisdictions heavily dependent on natural resource revenues. New
Brunswick and Quebec, by contrast, top the list of governments that have tended to hit
their targets.
Canada’s reputation for good fiscal management is deserved, but events elsewhere are
raising the bar. Legislators and citizens alike should insist on comparable presentations in
budgets and public accounts, publication of results that is more transparent and timely,
and hold governments more strictly to account when the results – as is too often the case –
are badly out of line with budget plans.
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Introduction and Overview
Is fiscal policy out of control in the advanced
democracies? In some jurisdictions abroad, the
explosions of government spending and borrowing
after the 2008/09 crisis and slump show it is.
Greece’s example has worldwide attention: not
only is its public-sector debt so high that interest-
rate movements affect its fiscal balance more than
policy decisions, but deeper scrutiny is revealing
that its tracking of actual transactions – as
opposed to what was expected or planned – is
primitive.
1 Canada’s situation is very different:
borrowing costs are not currently a problem here,
and our financial management is comparatively
good. With disasters brewing abroad, however, the
stakes have risen, as has the need for transparency
and accountability in fiscal management. As this
annual update of the C.D. Howe Institute’s fiscal
accountability rankings reveals, Canadian
governments can still usefully do much to improve
their control over public funds and their
reporting to the public.
The fiscal cycle of Canada’s senior governments
normally turns on two major events. One is the
spring budget, containing the fiscal plan with key
revenue, spending and balance sheet items, usually
delivered around the beginning of the fiscal year
on April 1. These documents are forward-looking
and tend to make headlines – if they are rejected
by legislators, they trigger elections. The other is
the publication of the public accounts, containing
official, audited statements of financial results,
usually about eight months after the fiscal year-
end. These documents are backward-looking and
do not trigger confidence votes, so they create
less excitement.
The comparative inattention to public accounts
by legislators and voters is a shame. These
documents usually give key information about
how well the fiscal plans released with such fanfare
a year and a half earlier anticipated the actual
results. But not always: straightforward comparisons
with the relevant budgets are sometimes hard.
Newfoundland and Labrador, along with Prince
Edward Island, present incompatible figures in the
two documents, and the Northwest Territories and
Nunavut publish their public accounts objectionably
late – more than a year after the year to which they
apply has ended. Critically, where straightforward
comparisons between budgets and results are
possible, the public accounts typically show that
the government in question overshot its projected
spending. The cumulative total spending
overshoot for Ottawa, the provinces and territories
over the past decade amounts to $82 billion, some
14 percent of total current expenditures and about
the same as the sum of currently projected deficits. 
While this snapshot is discouraging, our review
over time gives grounds for hope. The transparency
and comparability of budgets and public accounts
has improved in recent years. Incompatible
figures, once the rule, are now the exception.
While recent extraordinary events might
reasonably be expected to have thrown results
more out of line with budget plans, moreover, the
tendency of spending to overshoot the mark is less
evident in the last five years than the five before
them. We trust that this review of Canadian
governments’ financial controls will help
Canadians push for continued improvements in
the years ahead – years in which fiscal policy, even
in the best-governed countries, seems likely to
come under more intense scrutiny than ever.
This paper updates previous work on Canadian governments relative in-year fiscal performance. See Busby and Robson (2010, 2009, 2008)
and Adrian, Guillemette, Robson and (2007) for prior years’ accountability rankings. We thank our C.D. Howe Institute colleagues and a
number of outside reviewers for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. 
1 See, for example, IMF (2011, pp. 12-13, 47-48), which describes such problems as ineffective tax collection, lack of accounting officers in
government operations, weak parliamentary controls, fragmented and inadequate tracking of spending commitments, and fiscal reporting




The premises behind our survey of governments’
fiscal accountability are straightforward: first, that
without poring over dozens of pages, tables of
numbers and footnotes, or doing lots of arithmetic,
a person of reasonable intelligence – or a
motivated but time-constrained elected
representative – should be able to pick the key
revenue and spending totals out of a budget or a
set of public accounts; second, that with no
inordinate effort or expertise, this person should
be able to compare the same totals between the
two documents. Ideally, then, the figures this
person would use – and the ones we would use in
this review – would be displayed early and
prominently in each year’s budget documents and
in Volume 1 of each year’s public accounts.
Comparability and Quality of Fiscal
Information
In the case of some Canadian governments – the
federal and Ontario governments being key
examples – finding and comparing these numbers
is straightforward.
2 Budgets and public accounts
present the key aggregates in places that are easy
to find and in formats that are easy to interpret.
The accounting basis for the two documents is the
same. Better yet, the public accounts provide
reconciliations of the results to the budget figures,
showing and explaining variances. A reservation-
free note from the relevant auditor is another key
sign of quality. Prompt publication also matters: it
is clearly more useful, for example, to get each
year’s public accounts in the summer or fall, well
ahead of the end of the subsequent fiscal year and
the presentation of the budget for the fiscal year
following that.
In other cases, though, the comparisons are
tougher and the quality of the numbers is lower.
The key aggregates are hard to find, or to interpret
once they are found. The accounting basis for the
budget and the public accounts is different. The
auditor expresses reservations about the public
accounts. And, as in the case of some territorial
governments, the public accounts are released
unconscionably late: more than 12 months after
the end of the fiscal year to which they apply, and
well after the following budget has been tabled. 
To begin our survey of the fiscal transparency
and accountability of Canada’s federal and
provincial governments, we ask the following
specific questions:
￿ Are the key spending and revenue figures
prominently displayed in budget documents and
public accounts?
￿ Are the key spending and revenue figures that are
prominently displayed in budget documents and
public accounts comparable and reconcilable? 
￿ Do the public accounts clearly show deviations
from budget figures and explain the reasons for
them?
￿ Does the jurisdiction use quarterly or mid-year
updates to show deviations from budget plans?
￿ Does the relevant auditor express any concerns
about the public accounts figures?
￿ How soon after the end of the fiscal year did the
public accounts appear?
The results of this survey appear in Table 1.
Ottawa, Ontario and New Brunswick set the
standard for transparency and comprehensiveness
in helping readers understand the relationship of
results to budget plans. In each case, the key
figures are easy to find, comparisons of results to
2 That the numbers are straightforwardly and consistently presented does not mean that they necessarily capture everything that they can or
should. One of these authors has argued, for example, that Ottawa’s financial statements understate the cumulative obligation and ongoing
accruals of federal-employee pensions (Laurin and Robson 2010), a problem that afflicts all provinces and territories to at least some degree.
Another disputed area is the netting of tax credits against revenue: many would argue that governments should report fully refundable
credits, or potentially any credit unrelated to a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate as spending, with revenues shown gross of the credits. Consensus
on how private- and public-sector financial statements should reflect economic reality is not a realistic objective. For the purposes of this
study, conventional practices as reflected in public-sector auditing standards, published in the CICA Public Sector Accounting Handbook
(PSACC), are the appropriate benchmark. Backgrounder 142 | 3
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Table 1: Evaluating the Reporting Practices of Public Accounts Documents in Canada, 2009/10
Source: Authors’ estimates based on 2009/10 Public Accounts documents. 
Note: Astute readers will note that Ottawa publishes a monthly fiscal monitor to show the month by month fiscal results. These figures,















Number of Auditor reservations





Federal Yes, budget figures
match A
Public Accounts use multiple
tables and figures, supported
by text, at the beginning of
document. 
A Yes (H)* 0 (0) – No major reservations 26-Aug-10
NL
Comparable budget







explanations, figures do not
appear in main documents.
D No 0 (0) – No major reservations 10-Dec-10
PEI  Revised estimates
appear in public accounts C
Reconciliation table appears
late in document, without
explanation for changes.




appear later in public
accounts
B
Variance tables given, with
explanation of deviations from
budget, but comes later in
document.
A No
1 (0) – Last reservation, in
1999/00, was about a late report
from a Crown Corporation
regarding its pension liabilities. 
30-Jun-10
NB Yes, budget figures
match A
Multiple variance tables and
figures, supported by text, at
the beginning of document. 
A Yes (H) 0 (0) – No major reservations 30-Jul-10
QC
Budget Figures match
only in unaudited Volume
II of Public Accounts
D
Multiple variance tables and
graphics, supported by text,
but for different budget
figures, at the beginning of
Volume I in the public
accounts. 
C Yes (H)
17 (0) – Reservations from
2001/02 to 2005/06 concerned
the exclusion of broader public
sector in education and health
from results, improper recording
of pension liabilities and losses
on guaranteed financial initiatives 
12-Nov-10
ON Yes, budget figures
match A
Multiple variance tables,
supported by text, at the
beginning of document.
A Yes (Q) 0 (0) – No major reservations 30-Jul-10
MB Yes, budget figures
match A
Variance tables, some
explanation of deviations from
budget, but comes later in
document. 
B Yes (Q)
3 (0) – Most recent reservation in
2006/07 is the exclusion of public




SK Yes, budget figures
match A
Good use of reconciliation
tables, detailed explanation
for variation, results appear at
beginning of document. 
B Yes (Q)
24 (2) – Ongoing objections to
recording transaction with Fiscal
Stabilization Fund as revenue or
expense and lack of recording for
pension liabilities 
4-Jun-10
AB Yes, budget figures
match A
No use of reconciliation tables
or explanations, results
appear early in document. 
C Yes (Q) 0 (0) – No major reservations 21-Jun-10





early in document. 
B Yes (Q)







Budget figures do not
match. Comparable




Some use of reconciliation
tables or explanations, results
appear early in document. 
C No
0 (0) – Clean record since
2000/01, when interim
expenditures were made without
submitting a proper appropriation
(without tabling an associated bill)
10-May-11
YK Budget figures do not
match F
Some reconciliation with
budget, an explanation of
variations, located in separate
document. 
B No
4 (1) – Most recent reservation
highlighted a violation of Financial
Administration Act through the
purchase of non-bank asset-
backed commercial paper
8-Oct-10
Nuna Budget figures do not
match  F




13 (2) – The Government of
Nunavut has never tabled its
consolidated financial accounts
on time. 2007/08 reservations,
like the year prior, are concerned
with the Nunavut Business Credit
Corp.’s improper books of
accounts. 
N/A| 4 Backgrounder 142
C.D. Howe Institute
budgets are clearly presented using the same
accounting, and the relevant auditors expressed no
major reservations. Saskatchewan, Alberta, British
Columbia and Nova Scotia produced their public
accounts quite quickly – before the end of June –
while most other jurisdictions followed shortly
after, in July and August. 
Less happily, Quebec, Newfoundland and
Labrador, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut
do not use the same accounting for their budgets
and public accounts. Among other jurisdictions
that do use the same accounting in both, some do
not provide reconciliations of results to budgets,
or do so in ways that are hard to find or understand.
Our table also reports examples of qualifications
by auditors, such as in Saskatchewan and British
Columbia, and some very late releases of public
accounts, including the Northwest Territories and
the egregious example of Nunavut.
Although Table 1 provides a snapshot rather
than showing changes relative to the past, some
key improvements deserve mention. Canada’s
senior governments increasingly publish in-year
updates – usually quarterly reports – that track
results relative to budget projections. On this
score, western and central provinces are more
likely to have many fiscal update publications
during the budget cycle. Happily, while it has not
been many years since all Canada’s senior
governments used different accounting in their
budgets and public accounts, this is becoming
rare. In 2009/10, Yukon published a “Financial
Statement and Discussion” that compares
budgeted to actual amounts – a step toward
comparable presentation throughout that other
non-conforming jurisdictions should imitate, and
that Yukon should see through to the logical
conclusion of using consistent accounting for both.
3
Further, in fiscal year 2010/11, Quebec has
announced that it will publish the public accounts
on the same accounting basis as its budget. 
Scoring Budget Over- and Undershoots
Before we can present a scoresheet of governments’
stewardship of public money, we need to deal with
some of the financial-reporting deficiencies that can
complicate what should be a straightforward
process of pulling and comparing the key numbers
from the budgets and public accounts.
The worst deficiency is the Territorial public
accounts not yet published. For these missing
years, we use figures from the Department of
Finance’s fiscal reference tables for the most recent
year.
4 Turning to the matter of clear and accessible
presentation, in the case of Newfoundland and
Labrador, we deviate from our rule that the
comparison should be between the most prominent
totals in budgets and public accounts. That
province uses a different accounting basis for the
two sets of figures, but its public accounts provide
a variance report on the same accounting basis as
the budget, and our judgement is that the
additional report is prominently enough displayed
to warrant using for the comparison.
Finally, the fact that budget and public accounts
presentations in some jurisdictions still use
different accounting, and historically more did,
makes it impossible to get meaningful figures by
comparing levels of spending or revenue between
the two documents, or calculating gaps or percent
changes with regard to a base figure chosen from
one or the other. Instead, we calculate percent
changes from the prior year’s figures reported in
the same document – the budget in the case of
budgets, and the public accounts in the case of the
public accounts – and compare those two numbers.
3 Canadian municipalities do not use similar accounting methods in their budgets and in presenting their financial results; the example of the
senior governments is important in showing that opposition to doing so can be overcome, and that a long history of inconsistent accounting
is no justification for continuing with it. See Dachis and Robson (forthcoming) for a similar survey of the financial accountability of
Canada’s municipal governments.
4 This fill-in is admittedly very inadequate, since the fiscal reference tables’ main source of data is the public account documents in each
jurisdiction, and when those are not available the fiscal reference table uses the most recent budgetary information. Backgrounder 142 | 5
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Spending
Those caveats noted, we turn to the record over the
past decade. Table 2 documents budget projections
versus end-of-year results for each fiscal year since
2000/01, showing yearly percent changes in
spending as projected in budgets in the top panel,
yearly percent changes in spending as reported in
public accounts in the middle panel, and the
difference between them in the bottom panel.
We use two measures to summarize the 10-year
record (Table 3):
￿ Bias – the average difference between actual and
predicted results. This is the arithmetic mean of
the differences shown in the bottom panel of
Table 1, and captures the direction – over or
under – of actual versus budgeted results,
weighing each percent deviation over the
period equally. 
Table 2: Budgeted and Annual Expenditures, 2000/01-2009/10
Sources: Federal/Provincial/Territorial budget documents; fiscal reference tables (Finance Canada); authors’ calculations. 
Projected Spending Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT Yukon Nunavut
2000/01 0.6 3.1 1.5 -0.6 -2.3 2.8 -1.2 -0.6 3.6 1.8 -1.3 4.8 -1.9 3.2
2001/02 5.1 5.4 -0.2 0.5 6.6 3.4 2.2 1.7 5.8 12.5 7. 4 4.5 -1.1 1.8
2002/03 3.3 1.5 1.3 0.9 4.4 2.0 3.5 2.2 -0.8 -8.1 -0.3 5.1 -4.4 2.0
2003/04 2.8 5.5 4.7 3.8 4.3 4.3 7. 1 4.1 3.4 0.2 -2.4 5.7 -6.8 3.2
2004/05 2.3 0.4 -3.6 4.9 2.3 3.1 6.9 1.1 0.9 2.9 -2.6 2.7 5.1 -6.5
2005/06 1.9 5.5 1.4 4.2 3.2 3.3 4.2 3.5 1.1 5.7 4.7 1.5 5.0 -2.3
2006/07 5.0 10.1 2.6 6.3 1.7 4.1 2.1 3.4 0.1 4.0 3.7 0.8 -3.1 2.6
2007/08 4.6 17.1 8.0 5.1 2.9 3.9 2.6 5.8 1.6 11.7 3.9 4.7 -0.6 2.8
2008/09 2.3 11.1 6.4 2.5 2.7 3.6 0.2 3.3 4.6 9.7 1.1 -1.5 -0.9 4.0
2009/10 8.9 12.2 9.2 6.7 5.9 3.3 11.9 1.8 -0.9 -1.8 4.9 1.0 4.4 1.3
2010/11 4.8 0.0 0.8 0.4 1.6 3.9 7. 0 1.6 0.1 4.2 2.3 5.6 -0.8 -7 .5
Actual Spending Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT Yukon Nunavut
2000/01 6.0 6.4 10.7 0.2 -2.3 4.9 -0.5 2.8 2.6 9.5 1.1 6.0 4.1 10.7
2001/02 2.1 5.5 3.8 5.1 7. 3 3.2 3.0 1.8 7. 0 9.9 10.1 9.2 5.5 8.4
2002/03 4.0 5.9 2.3 1.5 4.2 3.7 4.1 3.1 0.6 -1.5 1.1 5.7 3.0 5.1
2003/04 3.5 5.1 12.6 6.6 3.9 3.6 7. 8 7. 1 6.2 5.9 1.1 5.8 9.0 7. 1
2004/05 11.5 0.8 0.3 7. 9 2.0 5.1 7. 4 2.7 3.9 11.1 1.4 5.6 10.7 2.9
2005/06 -0.8 4.9 1.8 6.1 5.9 4.6 5.7 7. 2 9.2 11.6 7. 2 7. 3 1.6 8.2
2006/07 6.2 5.0 3.3 4.6 5.3 5.8 4.9 5.3 7. 4 9.1 4.8 4.3 6.7 5.6
2007/08 4.8 11.2 8.2 8.3 7. 3 6.3 9.4 8.7 3.9 20.4 7. 2 11.0 6.3 8.8
2008/09 2.6 13.8 7. 9 4.8 6.3 4.4 0.4 4.3 20.4 8.3 3.5 5.0 5.7 12.8
2009/10 14.9 8.0 11.6 4.0 5.7 10.8 12.0 4.3 -2.5 -1.1 2.8 3.4 9.0 1.1
Difference (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT Yukon Nunavut
2000/01 5.3 3.3 9.2 0.8 0.0 2.1 0.7 3.4 -1.1 7. 7 2.4 1.2 6.0 7. 5
2001/02 -3.1 0.1 4.0 4.6 0.7 -0.2 0.8 0.1 1.2 -2.6 2.7 4.8 6.7 6.6
2002/03 0.7 4.4 1.0 0.6 -0.2 1.7 0.7 0.9 1.3 6.5 1.4 0.6 7. 5 3.1
2003/04 0.7 -0.4 7. 9 2.8 -0.4 -0.6 0.7 3.0 2.7 5.7 3.5 0.1 15.8 3.9
2004/05 9.2 0.4 3.9 3.0 -0.3 2.0 0.5 1.6 3.0 8.2 4.0 2.9 5.5 9.4
2005/06 -2.6 -0.6 0.4 2.0 2.7 1.2 1.5 3.7 8.1 5.9 2.4 5.8 -3.4 10.5
2006/07 1.2 -5.1 0.7 -1.7 3.6 1.7 2.8 2.0 7. 2 5.1 1.1 3.5 9.8 3.0
2007/08 0.1 -5.9 0.3 3.2 4.5 2.4 6.8 2.9 2.3 8.7 3.4 6.3 6.9 6.0
2008/09 0.3 2.8 1.5 2.2 3.7 0.8 0.2 0.9 15.7 -1.4 2.4 6.5 6.6 8.9
2009/10 6.0 -4.2 2.4 -2.7 -0.2 7. 5 0.2 2.5 -1.5 0.8 -2.1 2.4 4.5 -0.2| 6 Backgrounder 142
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￿ Accuracy – the root average square of the
deviations. If over- and under-shoots cancel out,
a series of large misses will have the same bias
score as a series of small misses. The accuracy
measure weighs the larger misses in the bottom
panel of Table 2 more heavily and sums them
without regard to sign – a useful summary of
how close governments were to their targets,
regardless of whether the result was above or below
the projection.
When it comes to bias, the results in Table 3 show
a clear tendency to overshoot rather than undershoot
spending targets. Of the 14 governments, only
Newfoundland shows a negative average error – a
small undershoot – over the 10 years and the
average of all governments for the period is an
overshoot of 2.7 percentage points. The cumulative
overshoot of all governments for the period was
$82 billion – a large number by any standard, equal
to the entire amount of projected deficits across
Canadian jurisdictions in 2010/11.
Table 3: Bias and Accuracy in Budget Forecasts of Changes in Spending, 2000/01-2009/10
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, fiscal reference tables (Finance Canada), authors’ calculations.
Jurisdiction















Federal 1.8 6 4.1 9 34,942 12
Newfoundland -0.5 1 3.4 7 -333 -
Prince Edward Island 3.1 9 4.3 10 316 21
Nova Scotia 1.5 4 2.6 5 839 9
New Brunswick 1.4 3 2.3 2 895 11
Quebec 1.4 2 1.8 1 10,740 15
Ontario 1.5 5 2.4 4 12,199 10
Manitoba 2.1 7 2.4 3 1,805 14
Saskatchewan 3.9 11 6.3 12 2,994 30
Alberta 4.5 12 5.9 11 10,419 27
British Columbia 2.1 8 2.7 6 6,088 15
Northwest Territories 3.4 10 4.1 8 284 22
Yukon 6.6 14 8.0 14 458 43
Nunavut 5.9 13 6.7 13 616 51Backgrounder 142 | 7
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As for rankings, Newfoundland’s closeness to
target overall puts it in first place, with Quebec,
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Ontario
clustered together with average overshoots of
1.4–1.5 percentage points. Scanning the country
from east to west, the rankings generally
deteriorate. Alberta and Saskatchewan are the
worst-performing provinces, with average
overshoots of about 4 percentage points, and
Yukon and Nunavut bring up the rear, with
average overshoots in the 6-plus range. The federal
government’s mean overshoot of 1.8 percentage
points puts it in the middle of the pack.
The accuracy measures tell a slightly different
story. Quebec compliments its good bias score
with a first-place – that is, smallest – 1.8
percentage-point standard deviation. New
Brunswick, Manitoba and Ontario also show
respectable accuracy scores. Newfoundland,
however, shows a less impressive 3.4 percentage
point score, suggesting an element of luck in its
good 10-year bias performance. Bringing up the
rear among the provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan
also have the worst accuracy scores, and Nunavut
and Yukon’s scores of over 7 percentage points put
them worst of all. Ottawa’s standard deviation is
about 4 percentage points, below the median
score for all senior governments.
Revenue
The annual results for revenue, calculated the
same way as the spending results just surveyed,
appear in Table 4, while Table 5 shows the
corresponding summary measures for the decade.
In general, Canadian governments appear in
retrospect to have been conservative in their
budget revenue projections: only Ontario has seen
revenues come in lower than expected on average,
and the mean positive revenue surprise for all
governments over the decade was 4.3 percent. As
it happens, this unique performance by Ontario –
like Newfoundland’s in spending – comes with an
unimpressive accuracy score. Jurisdictions that are
more dependent on natural resource revenues,
which have surprised on the up-side more often
than not over the past decade, tended to overshoot
their revenue targets the most, with
Newfoundland, Saskatchewan and Alberta
showing bias measures of 7, 10 and 
12 percentage points respectively. The federal
government’s relatively good showing in this
respect puts it in fourth place among the senior
governments.
As for accuracy, Ontario’s standard deviation of
4.6 percentage points puts it in the middle of the
pack: seriously adverse revenue surprises in the
past two years counteracted happier surprises in
earlier years to produce its low bias score. In general,
jurisdictions with greater dependence on natural
resources tended to have less accurate revenue
projections, with Newfoundland, Saskatchewan
and Alberta scoring worst on this scale. Ottawa
again shows relatively well, standing in fourth place.
The Association between Revenue and
Spending Overshoots
It is natural to wonder if governments’ tendency
to overshoot spending targets is related to their
tendency to overshoot revenue targets. This could
happen for several reasons or combinations of
reasons. It could be because of genuine surprises –
buoyant natural resource revenues creating a
boom that also creates unexpected demands for
public services, for example. It could be because
governments deliberately budget conservatively to
leave room for happy in-year surprises. Or it
could be because governments manage their
reported numbers to achieve targeted bottom-line
results. This survey of under- and overshoots
cannot say definitively why the pattern occurs for
any given government, but it does reveal an
association between surprises on the revenue and
spending sides across the country.
Table 6 presents the correlations between the
annual in-year revenue and spending surprises
over the decade for each jurisdiction. For every
government but Nunavut, the relationship is
positive – in six jurisdictions it is over the
55 percent level that normal statistical tests say is
significant, with Ontario and the Northwest
Territories showing around 60 percent,
Saskatchewan and Alberta showing 70 percent| 8 Backgrounder 142
plus, and Quebec showing a correlation of nearly
90 percent. We accord jurisdictions with lower
correlations higher ranks in our assessment, on the
grounds that in-year spending surprises occurring
thanks to higher-than-expected revenues – or,
worse, deliberate manipulation of numbers to
achieve a target bottom line – undermine
accountability to legislators and voters.
Splitting the Sample: Did Governments Get
Better over the Decade?
It is also natural to wonder about trends over
time: have Canadian governments become better
or worse at fulfilling their budget promises? Table
7 provides a very rough assessment of this question:
rough because one or two extraordinary years will
naturally affect a five-year average more than a 10-
year one, and also because the final two years of
the decade were highly unusual.
C.D. Howe Institute
Table 4: Budgeted and Actual Revenues, 2000/01-2009/10
Sources: Federal/Provincial/Territorial budget documents; fiscal reference tables (Finance Canada); authors’ calculations. 
Projected Revenue Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT Yukon Nunavut
2000/01 1.3 3.9 -1.7 0.2 -1.5 2.8 -0.7 1.3 9.8 -1.6 0.5 4.9 1.7 3.1
2001/02 -4.1 5.7 0.6 1.8 4.4 0.5 -1.0 0.6 -11.1 -10.7 2.3 1.6 0.9 5.5
2002/03 0.3 0.7 -0.4 3.1 1.2 2.0 4.9 0.6 2.3 -5.6 -3.6 -13.1 -2.4 -2.5
2003/04 3.4 1.8 4.6 3.8 4.4 4.3 7. 8 4.6 -2.8 -2.9 4.1 10.3 1.1 10.4
2004/05 3.4 -3.8 3.1 4.2 4.6 3.1 14.8 4.0 1.8 -9.4 3.2 6.9 2.1 2.7
2005/06 2.3 3.5 3.1 4.4 2.8 3.3 5.9 -0.3 -9.2 -4.9 1.1 1.9 5.0 5.4
2006/07 2.8 0.0 3.1 5.1 0.1 4.4 2.1 3.4 -3.5 -6.3 -0.3 2.0 1.1 2.5
2007/08 1.9 15.8 8.0 5.8 2.8 1.2 2.6 5.8 -6.2 -4.7 -1.7 4.3 -3.3 2.9
2008/09 -1.1 -3.7 6.8 2.3 2.7 0.1 0.4 1.3 -0.3 2.2 -2.3 -4.5 1.0 4.5
2009/10 -4.9 -29.5 6.7 -1.0 -0.6 -0.4 2.7 -0.4 -12.4 -11.1 -1.9 3.4 5.3 5.6
2010/11 8.0 5.6 3.0 3.7 1.8 2.9 10.9 1.7 -0.8 1.3 5.8 5.0 7. 9 5.9
Actual Revenue Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT Yukon Nunavut
2000/01 9.0 6.8 4.5 6.4 1.3 7. 8 2.8 6.5 15.4 28 10.4 22.1 13.7 10.8
2001/02 -3.3 -1.3 4.2 1.0 7. 7 -1.5 -1.2 -0.1 -10.2 -14.1 -5.5 10.5 -4.5 -5.2
2002/03 3.8 2.5 -2.8 1.0 -1.3 4.2 3.7 3.2 6.7 3.5 -3.3 -11.4 6.5 10.3
2003/04 4.7 2.9 5.3 7. 2 4.1 4.3 -0.7 4.7 1.6 14.3 8.1 3.0 12.0 6.0
2004/05 7. 2 2.1 9.5 9.4 9.4 4.5 13.8 11.5 19.1 13.6 14.2 13.1 12.0 10.1
2005/06 5.2 18.9 5.0 7. 0 5.8 5.9 8.3 2.3 5.5 22.0 7. 9 11.4 9.4 13.2
2006/07 6.2 -3.2 5.4 5.7 5.2 9.3 7. 4 6.1 5.3 7. 7 7. 1 8.7 5.5 19.0
2007/08 2.8 30.2 5.9 12.2 5.0 5.6 7. 5 9.4 14.4 0.0 3.5 12.9 2.1 -7 .3
2008/09 -3.8 28.3 5.8 -0.6 2.1 -0.3 -6.9 3.4 26.2 -6.3 -3.7 -6.1 5.0 9.7
2009/10 -6.1 -20.6 8.7 0.9 -1.7 8.4 -1.2 -0.9 -16.9 0.2 -2.0 2.0 6.8 8.2
Difference (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT Yukon Nunavut
2000/01 7. 7 2.9 6.2 6.2 2.8 5.0 3.5 5.3 5.6 29.6 9.8 17.2 12.1 7. 7
2001/02 0.8 -7 .1 3.6 -0.8 3.3 -1.9 -0.2 -0.7 0.8 -3.3 -7 .8 8.9 -5.4 -10.7
2002/03 3.4 1.8 -2.4 -2.1 -2.5 2.2 -1.1 2.6 4.4 9.0 0.3 1.7 8.8 12.9
2003/04 1.3 1.1 0.7 3.4 -0.3 0.1 -8.5 0.1 4.3 17.2 4.0 -7 .4 10.8 -4.4
2004/05 3.9 5.9 6.4 5.2 4.9 1.4 -1.0 7. 5 17.3 23.0 11.0 6.3 9.9 7. 4
2005/06 2.9 15.4 1.9 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.6 14.7 26.9 6.8 9.4 4.4 7. 8
2006/07 3.4 -3.2 2.3 0.6 5.1 4.9 5.2 2.7 8.8 14.1 7. 5 6.7 4.4 16.5
2007/08 0.9 14.4 -2.1 6.4 2.1 4.4 4.9 3.6 20.5 4.6 5.2 8.6 5.4 -10.3
2008/09 -2.7 32.1 -0.9 -2.9 -0.5 -0.4 -7 .3 2.1 26.5 -8.5 -1.4 -1.5 4.0 5.2
2009/10 -1.3 8.9 2.0 1.9 -1.2 8.8 -4.0 -0.5 -4.5 11.4 -0.2 -1.4 1.5 2.6Backgrounder 142 | 9
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Table 5: Bias and Accuracy in Budget Forecasts of Changes in Revenue, 2000/01-2009/10
Sources: Federal/Provincial/Territorial budget documents; fiscal reference tables (Finance Canada); authors’ calculations. 
Jurisdiction














Federal 2.0 4 3.4 4 34,565 15
Newfoundland 7. 2 12 12.9 12 4,257 63
Prince Edward Island 1.8 3 3.4 3 174 12
Nova Scotia 2.0 5 3.8 6 1,186 14
New Brunswick 1.7 2 3.0 1 933 13
Quebec 2.1 6 3.1 2 15,268 24
Ontario -0.6 1 4.6 7 -5,152 -5
Manitoba 2.5 7 3.5 5 2,056 16
Saskatchewan 9.8 13 13.4 13 7 ,544 76
Alberta 12.4 14 17.1 14 31,679 93
British Columbia 3.5 9 6.5 8 10,763 27
Northwest Territories 4.8 10 8.3 10 441 32
Yukon 5.6 11 7. 4 9 358 34
Nunavut 3.5 8 9.4 11 258 21
Table 6: Correlation of Surprises, 2000/01-2009/10
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT Yukon Nunavut
Correlation of
surprises
0.29 0.08 0.56 0.12 0.27 0.87 0.62 0.19 0.74 0.71 0.29 0.59 0.26 -0.06
Rank 7 2 9 3 6 14 11 4 13 12 8 10 5 1
Note: The short, 10-year period of observations makes the statistically significant level of correlation about 0.55 with a two-tailed 10 percent
significance test.| 10 Backgrounder 142
For what they are worth, the results give
grounds for tentative optimism when it comes to
spending biases. More jurisdictions had smaller
overshoots during the 2005/06-to-2009/10 period
than during the five years before it, lowering the
national average bias from about 2.9 percentage
points to about 2.6 percentage points. The
accuracy scores, by contrast, deteriorated on
average. Prince Edward Island, Yukon, Ottawa
and Alberta deserve mention for achieving
improvements in both their bias and accuracy
scores in the more recent five-year period;
Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, the Northwest
Territories, Ontario and Quebec saw deteriorations
in both.
The results on the revenue side are also mixed.
Alberta and Yukon showed improvements on both
the bias and accuracy measures, as did Ottawa –
which, though its scores are less noticeable in
percentage terms, inevitably matters a great deal
for the national fiscal scene. Newfoundland and
Saskatchewan saw the biggest deteriorations
C.D. Howe Institute
Table 7: Improvements and Deteriorations in Accountability, 2000/01-2004/05 vs. 2005/06-2009/10
(percentage points)
Expenditures





2.6 1.6 5.2 2.4 0.0 1.0 0.7 1.8 1.4 5.1 2.8 1.9 8.3 6.1 2.9
Bias: 
Last 5 years
1.0 -2.6 1.0 0.6 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.4 6.4 3.8 1.4 4.5 4.9 5.6 2.6
Difference -1.6 -4.2 -4.2 -1.7 2.9 1.7 1.6 0.6 4.9 -1.3 -1.4 2.6 -3.4 -0.5 -0.3
Accuracy:
First 5 years
5.0 2.5 6.0 2.8 0.4 1.5 0.7 2.2 2.0 6.5 2.9 2.6 9.1 6.5 3.6
Accuracy:
Last 5 years
3.0 4.2 1.3 2.4 3.3 3.7 3.4 2.6 8.6 5.3 2.4 5.1 6.6 6.8 4.2
Difference -2.0 1.7 -4.7 -0.4 2.9 2.1 2.7 0.4 6.6 -1.2 -0.6 2.5 -2.5 0.3 0.6
Revenues





3.4 0.9 2.9 2.4 1.6 1.3 -1.5 3.0 6.5 15.1 3.5 5.3 7. 2 2.6 3.9
Bias: 
Last 5 years
0.6 13.5 0.6 1.7 1.7 4.1 0.3 2.1 13.2 9.7 3.6 4.4 3.9 4.4 4.6
Difference -2.8 12.6 -2.3 -0.7 0.1 2.7 1.7 -0.9 6.7 -5.4 0.1 -1.0 -3.3 1.8 0.7
Accuracy:
First 5 years
4.2 4.4 4.4 4.1 3.1 2.7 4.2 4.3 8.6 18.9 7. 7 9.7 9.7 9.1 6.8
Accuracy:
Last 5 years
2.4 17.7 1.9 3.5 2.9 5.1 5 2.5 17.0 15.1 5.1 6.5 4.1 9.7 7. 0
Difference -1.8 13.3 -2.5 -0.6 -0.2 2.4 0.8 -1.8 8.4 -3.8 -2.5 -3.2 -5.5 0.6 0.2
Sources: Federal/Provincial/Territorial budget documents; fiscal reference tables (Finance Canada); authors’ calculations. Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
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The principal message from this review of fiscal
intentions and outcomes over the decade to
2009/10 is that spending overshoots are very
common – too common to be accidental. Canada
went into the 2009 slump in better fiscal shape
than most developed countries, but would have
been better equipped yet if governments had stuck
to their previous fiscal plans. The cumulative $82
billion in spending beyond what legislatures
approved at the beginning of their fiscal years
represents a large amount of debt not paid down
and taxes that are higher than elected representatives
presumably intended when making early plans.
Better scrutiny by legislators and voters
generally should help improve this record – a
process this report is intended to assist. Beyond
this general exhortation, however, a handful of
specific changes in parliamentary processes
might help.
One helpful change would be a stronger role for
public accounts committees – historically, the
bodies providing key oversight of public accounts
documents and governments’ financial management
in Westminster-style governments. The relative
importance of parliamentary committees, such as
public accounts committees or complementary
bodies such as the Government Operations and
Estimates Committee in the Parliament of
Canada, appears to have diminished over time
(Malloy 2004); regular reports from them that
explored in-year deviations from plans would
strengthen parliamentary oversight of
governmental decisions.
5
A complementary change would be better
presentation of information in the supplementary
estimates that legislatures vote to approve in-year
changes, after the voting of the main estimates
that reflect the budget plans. Each set of
supplementary estimates should show item-by-
item comparisons to budget plans, and show how
the supplementary estimates, if approved, would
work with or against the plans. For instance, was
spending on a given program announced in the
budget? Does it indirectly flow from a budget
initiative? Or, depending on whether it is voted or
statutory, is the amount different from what was
planned in the budget?
6 Such presentations might
have inclined parliamentarians to ask different
questions about how their decisions affected the
overall fiscal plan: in general, they would equip
legislators with better information on how the
fiscal year is unfolding differently from what was
anticipated in the spring budget, and whether
they should do anything about it. 
More powerful committees providing better
scrutiny of in-year developments could help
resolve the awkward choice about whether or not
to include reserves for contingent spending in
budgets. When governments know from
experience that they are likely to face demands
arising from events such as natural disasters,
including such reserves in the fiscal plan helps
legislators anticipate the bottom line more
accurately. The objection to such reserves is that
they provide cover for spending that might not
pass muster if evaluated explicitly. On balance, we
would favour including such contingencies in
budgets, counting on appropriate parliamentary
scrutiny to ensure that they do not end up as
slush funds.
Finally, the timeliness of the publication of
public accounts matters, as they provide some
important information early on in the next budget
5 Although the bulk of estimates are referred to these committees, other federal committees also review estimates; for example, estimates that
fall under Finance are reviewed by the Finance committee and the same for the other committees.
6 Notably, Ottawa has developed a reporting tool, an Integrated Monitoring Database, which provides legislators with up-to-date quarterly
results contained in the government’s estimates. By demonstrating the variance of the actual results vis-à-vis the estimates, the database can
help parliamentarians highlight areas where greater scrutiny is needed. | 12 Backgrounder 142
cycle. Some provinces consistently publish their
public accounts earlier than others. Alberta, for
example, has enshrined in legislation the
requirement to publish public accounts documents
before the end of June, which coincides with three
months after the close of the prior fiscal year and
the end of the first quarter of the new budget year.
Other provinces should consider similar legislation. 
Concluding Comments
Canada is among the best fiscally managed
developed countries, and not by accident: the
transparency and rigour of its federal and
provincial budgets and public accounts are better
than those of most counterparts abroad. The
recent record shows, however, that Canadians can
legitimately demand better. The past decade’s
cumulative spending overshoot, and the likely
impact of fiscal debacles elsewhere, should be
inspirations for Canadian governments to improve
their financial reporting and their adherence to
targets, and for legislators to exercise their powers
to hold them to the mark.
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